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1Since this problem is unlikely to be solved in practice (requiring quasi-linear preferences, and the
like), further weight is added to the arguments of the main text that current provision levels of
certain public goods are likely to fall short of socially optimal levels.  For a host of arguments,
most unrelated to the present discussion, that suggest that decision-makers are likely to under-
provide public goods see Graves 2007.
I. Introduction and Motivation
For pure public goods, Samuelson (1954) showed that optimal provision levels
would result if individual willingness-to-pay were aggregated (added vertically,
in a graphical setting) to arrive at marginal benefits to be compared to marginal
provision costs.  This follows from the non-rivalrous nature of public goods; any
individual receiving benefits does not reduce the benefits received by others.
Aggregating in this manner would, he argued, result in levels of public goods
provision exactly paralleling the desirable efficiency conditions typically
associated with perfectly-functioning private markets.
Samuelson was aware that the application of his recommended
methodology for optimal public goods provision would be very difficult in
practical policy settings.  True aggregate marginal willingness to pay will be
difficult to infer, since each individual has an incentive to understate preferences
when asked to contribute.  This is the well-known (output) demand revelation, or
"free rider," problem for public goods, due to inability to exclude users, that has
been addressed under somewhat restrictive conditions elsewhere (see Clarke
1971, Groves and Ledyard 1977).  
However, since Samuelson correctly interpreted inputs as negative
outputs, assigning them a minus sign, the traditionally recognized output demand
revelation problem also implicitly embeds an input demand revelation problem
that has gone unrecognized.  That is, we work to acquire the goods we desire, and
if an increment to work effort does not allow an increment to consumption of the
goods we desire, that increment to work effort will not take place–because leisure
is valuable.  This input demand revelation problem has been ignored in both
theoretical discussion and in all applied benefit-cost valuation work for the case
of public goods.  In much of what follows I will assume that the output demand
revelation problem as traditionally discussed has been solved, although that is not
important to the argument.    1
Motivating the discussion of the following sections, consider two types of
individuals.  The first, Ben Shoppin, desires mega-mansions, expensive sports
cars, foreign vacations, designer clothing, gourmet restaurant meals, and fine
wine.  Ben realizes that he has three options for achieving his goals, only one of
which is practical.  He could hope that someone will give him what he wants or
perhaps that he could steal what he wants.  Absent philanthropy or theft, however,
Ben will realize that the only way to obtain his desired goods is to generate the
2I am focusing on environmental goods in the text, rather than say national defense, for two reasons.
First, abstracting from cost, environmental goods would have positive or at least zero marginal values
to all.  National defense, and certain other public goods, might on the margin be “bads” for many
individuals, complicating a bit the direction of the bias in income generation discussed here.  Second,
in the case of national defense (and certain other collectively provided goods) special interest political
influence might also render the direction of provision bias uncertain.  
3
It should be noted that a) some individuals with pronounced social consciences might work more than
would normally be considered rational in this case, b) some individuals will volunteer in an effort to
make a difference in that way, and c) some individuals will work in the political arena to acquire what
they think socially desirable.  In all cases, however, they will do less than is socially desirable, if
rational, because personal costs will be large relative to personal benefits for all such actions.
4
Were preferences homogeneous it is, of course, much more likely that the political outcome would
be nearer the true Samuelson optimum optimorum than is the case with large variations in both
preferences and human capital.
income  necessary to acquire them.  The critical observation for present purposes,
however, is that if Ben generates the income, he knows that he can in fact acquire
what he wants, because what he wants are ordinary private goods.
Now consider Sten (for strong environmentalist).  What Sten cares most
2about are more wilderness areas, cleaner air and water, reduced CO  build-up,
species preservation, and so on.   He has quite limited desires for ordinary private2
goods.  Sten differs importantly from Ben because the former will realize, if
rational, that any income generated to acquire the public goods that he desires
will be negligible in that collectively-determined decision.  Since Sten cannot get
what he wants by giving up leisure, and since leisure is valuable, Sten will only
generate the income necessary to buy the limited range of private goods he
desires (and to pay for the costs, in terms of taxes or higher prices, of whatever
amount of public goods are provided collectively).  In extreme cases, Sten and
others like him might “drop out” in the jargon of ‘60s hippies.   But even in a3
world of homogeneous preferences involving relatively low demands for public
goods, the inability to individually increment public goods will result in non-
optimally low income generation.4
Further clarifying, consider two individuals who are observed to generate
fairly low, but identical, levels of income.  One is “lazy,” in the vernacular,
valuing leisure and not caring greatly for goods of any kind, private or public.
The other cares a great deal about public goods of various kinds and other goods
that are determined collectively–but she recognizes that any income that she
5The text examples are designed to clarify what this paper is not about.  Some reviewers of earlier
versions thought that the point was merely that, in general equilibrium, increments to the public good
would result in revised optimal work-leisure decisions.  While this is true (see Flores and Graves 2008
for further formal details), that effect may be of 2  order importance, particularly if benefit-costnd
analysis of public goods is conducted with sufficient frequency and for sufficiently small increments.
Moreover, the paper is not about complementarity, substitutability or separability conditions among
all goods consumed; only in unrealistic extreme cases would that have any important impact on the
free riding argument.  Further, the discussion has nothing to do with the ordinary (or tax-distorted)
elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage rate–that relationship is shifted by the free riding
in input markets discussed here.  Finally, while the omission of the input demand revelation problem
is more obvious if one does not employ a full income constrained utility model, employing such a
model does nothing to eliminate the free riding behavior in either output or input markets.  The point
of the paper is that there will always be input market free riding any time that conditions lead to the
traditionally recognized output market free riding behavior (people will not work if they are unable
to increment a class of goods they desire by doing so).  Input market free riding is completely
symmetric to–indeed embedded in–the oft-discussed output demand revelation problem. 
might generate would have a negligible impact on what she cares about.  To the
economist, these two individuals are observationally equivalent in that neither
person looks like they have much marginal willingness-to-pay for anything,
despite the latter’s strong desires for public goods.
As one last motivating example,  suppose the link between work effort5
and work reward were to be broken for ordinary private goods.  Imagine,
specifically, that an extreme egalitarian communist regime were to decide that
everyone will receive exactly $500 per month of goods and services; they must
generate income to pay for those goods and services but cannot acquire more than
that quantity, regardless of their income.  How much income will a rational
worker generate in such a system?  Regardless of their true marginal willingness-
to-pay for goods and regardless of how little they might value leisure relative to
goods, they will only generate $500 per month of income.  
The productivity of the collective farms of the old Soviet Union was very
low relative to that of the small privately owned farms.  Pundits argued at the
time that this was because the link between work effort and work reward was
largely broken for the former, but not for the latter.  But, public goods (and non-
individually incrementable goods more generally) represent, even in aggressively
free market private good economies, a similar–indeed a more extreme–case in
which the link between work effort and work reward is severed.
6In the heterogeneous preferences case, it is likely that even a quantity of the public good that is very
socially sub-optimal will be “too much” for some individuals, perhaps the poor and healthy in the
context of the environment.  For those individuals, the income under-generation argument of the text
evaporates; the input demand revelation problem in this case becomes a “non-binding disincentive.”
 
II The Input Demand Revelation Problem
As mentioned above, in his 1954 discussion, Samuelson indicated that inputs can
be handled just like outputs, but with a minus sign preceding them.  This implies,
as indicated in the introductory examples, that embedded in the traditionally-
recognized output demand revelation problem are input market demand revelation
difficulties.  Whenever conditions (non-excludability and non-rivalry in
consumption, in the case of pure public goods) lead to an output market failure,
there will be a concomitant input market failure (“free riding” in input markets).
The latter problem has been ignored in practical public policy settings, with the
income at which benefit-cost analyses of public goods are conducted being
implicitly taken to be optimal when it is in fact non-optimally low.  
For ordinary private goods one would certainly expect that there would be
neither an output demand revelation problem nor an input demand revelation
problem.  Indeed, as is well-known, a full-income model of rational individual
behavior recognizes that individuals will attempt to balance their goods demands
with their leisure demands, so that the utility gain from goods purchased with the
after-tax wage from the last hour worked exactly balances the utility value of the
foregone leisure to get those goods.  We work, in short, to get the things we want.
But suppose as with the introductory examples we cannot get, on the
margin, what we want by working?  Consider in particular the leisure choices that
result from desires for pure public goods.  Regardless of the extent of a rational
individual’s desire for a pure public good, each person will recognize that any
income generated to acquire it will be inconsequential; the public good outcome
is collectively determined, and this is well-known to every individual.  Since
leisure is both scarce and valuable, the typical person who cares about public
goods–everybody to varying degrees–will generate too little income.   They will6
equate the marginal value of leisure to the marginal value of private goods, but
not to the marginal value of public goods, since they cannot individually
increment public goods.
Consequently, using benefit-cost analysis to value pure public goods
implicitly starts with a given income that is presumed optimal when it is, in
7It would be implausible to suggest that decision-makers might accidentally hit upon the one true
Samuelson optimum optimorum, resulting in optimal work-leisure decisions.  To do so would require,
even with perfect demand revelation out of current income, that decision-makers accept public good
projects with costs in excess of apparent benefits (out of existing income) by the amount of the
ungenerated income that would have been devoted to public goods were individuals able to purchase
them as ordinary private goods.  As with the traditional demand revelation problem, individuals have
no incentive to accurately reveal that information to analysts.
8
It should perhaps be noted that the labor/leisure decision will also generally be affected by the
introduction of new goods.  Technological changes that result in a desirable new good will result in
greater work effort, while technological changes that lower the prices of existing goods will result in
reduced work effort.  Endogenous growth models do not yet allow for endogenous variation in labor
supply, yet doing so would provide a deeper understanding of the business cycle as well as better
clarifying the nature of GDP as a measure of welfare.  Additionally, the acquisition of human capital
will be biased downward to the extent that a) we educate ourselves to acquire the goods we want, and
b) some of those goods are not individually incrementable.  Furthermore, the disincentive discussed
here should result in at least some bias upward in the social rate of discount; bequests are likely to be
smaller since the saver will realize that his/her heirs will be unable to individually increment desirable
public goods.  
general, sub-optimal.    Moreover, all of the ungenerated income would, apart7
from general equilibrium effects, have been devoted to the public good (since
there is no incentive to under generate income to buy ordinary private goods).  If
aggregated marginal willingness-to-pay out of current income appears to just
equal marginal provision cost, the benefit-cost analyst will presume an optimum
exists when too little of the public good is being provided. 
III. An Illustrative Model
Consider a simple Cobb-Douglas formulation of the representative household’s
utility in a three-good world with ordinary goods, X (taken to be the numeraire),
leisure, L, and the public good, G, which might be thought of as environmental
quality:8
1) U = AX L G" $ (
This is to be maximized subject to the weekly full-income budget
constraint 168w = X + wL + tG, where w = real wage,  t = 1/nT with n being the
number of households and T being the marginal cost of providing the public
good.  As is well-known for the Cobb-Douglas, solving the first order conditions
for the optimal quantities, expressing them in terms of leisure, and substituting
into the budget constraint results in 168w = w"L/$ + wL + w(L/$.  If, say, " = .3,
$ = .6 and ( = .1 and taking wage to equal $10 for simplicity, L* = 100.8 hours at
the social optimum.  This implies that workers are earning (168 - 100.8)w, or
$672/week to pay for the optimal quantities of goods, leisure, and the public
9Suppose, for example, that a thousand homogeneous residents of a seaside village each had a net
present value for a lighthouse of $2,000 with the Cobb-Douglas utility coefficient being .1 for the
lighthouse.  If the lighthouse can be created for a net present cost of one million dollars, it should,
of course, be produced.  With free riding, it will not, however, get produced and each resident of
the village would generate $2,000 less income under independence.  
good.
However, the analyst does not observe Equation 1).  In the simple Cobb-
Douglas case, the larger is ( the more leisure is purchased–if this parameter takes
on the value of .1, then rational individuals would “buy” ten percent more leisure,
since expenditure shares equal the coefficients on the arguments of the utility
function.   Hence, the free riding behavior in input markets of interest here9
implies that the regulatory authority would observe the utility of the
representative household as being:
2)  U = AX L G  =  AX L" $ 0 " $
The problem is that G  in Equation 1) is not only an unknown optimal(
quantity, but one that individuals have no incentive to reveal in their observable
behavior, as the introductory examples clarify.  Individuals in maximizing
Equation 2) will buy more leisure (168w = w"L/$ + wL, which, for the same
parameters as assumed above, results in optimal leisure of 112 hours).  Hence,
workers will only work 56 hours generating $560/week to buy the “optimal”
quantities of private goods and leisure–these being the only two things they can
individually buy.  Since the leisure coefficient in Equation 1) is twice that of
private goods (and plausibly could be even relatively larger, in light of the large
number of hours worked with those parameters), a ten percent increase in leisure
results in a twenty percent reduction in income generated ($112 is twenty percent
of $560).       
The intuition of this result is perhaps easiest to understand in comparing
the last expression in Equation 2) to Equation 1)–it is as if another desirable
ordinary private good has been introduced in the latter.  The existence of another
valuable good implies cutbacks on quantities of the existing goods, and upon
leisure, until the equi-marginal principle applies to all three goods entering the
utility function.  This does not happen for public goods because they cannot be
individually incremented as emphasized in opening examples.
Initially, private goods and leisure are likely to be of primary concern in
the context of a typical developing economy, with demands for public goods
coming later.  Moreover, “natural” supplies of the public good (e.g. hunting rifles
for national defense or large initial stocks of environmental resources) might
exceed initial demands at low population and income levels.  Hence, initial
marginal willingness to pay might be near zero, at relatively large naturally
10
How early in the existence of a country various institutions will come into existence would depend
on the nature of the public good.  This might happen quite early for national defense in a dangerous
world, somewhat later for roads, lighthouses and the like and much later still for goods such as
environmental quality that might have been in great abundance relative to private goods initially.  The
Cobb-Douglas case, with no “choke-price,” would lead to earlier political interventions, though this
is perhaps an unrealistic utility specification for many public goods.  
11
The real world is considerably more complicated in that preferences are heterogeneous, with differing
intensities of demand for the public good.  If n representative households each paid 1/n of the marginal
provision cost, political outcomes might fairly quickly come to more closely approximate the true
Samuelson optimum optimorum.  Referenda are unlikely in practice to solve the problem raised here,
in light of heterogeneity of preferences and income.  
present G values.  One would expect, however, that the demand for the public
good would continually grow relative to the (possibly decreasing) supply until it
exceeds initial supply by enough to create a collective desire for intervention, at
least in a democratic economy.  When such a critical mass is achieved, an
institution will be brought into existence (e.g. creation of the EPA in 1970 in the
U.S.) to provide appropriate levels of the public good.10
How can the regulatory institution determine, in such cases, how much of
the public good to supply, when they observe Equation 2) but would like to
observe Equation 1)?  As a practical matter, they are likely to begin
conservatively, supplying initially a relatively small amount of the public good,
0, G  with early environmental regulations being representative.  In an “ideal”
world, at least from an economist’s perspective, they would like to supply the
0traditionally-defined socially optimal quantity, G *, which would likely exceed
0G .11
The traditional output demand revelation problem clarifies why it would
be difficult to infer the true parameters of Equation 1) from the “information” in
Equation 2), because each representative agent has an incentive to understate their
output demands, as is well-known.  It will be very difficult to determine the value
0of G *.
But–even if regulators were somehow able to know true demands from a
0given income, hence G *–those aggregated demands are being calculated at the
wrong income level, as seen in the simple Cobb-Douglas case.  The representative
households will alter their levels of leisure and private goods in response to the
0provision of  G *, but only to the extent that they must pay higher prices or taxes
12
More sophisticated functions could allow for complementarity or substitutability among the three
goods entering household utility, modifying quantitative conclusions; but the underlying input demand
revelation problem remains–a discrete disincentive to work remains when working does not allow
individual households to get more of what they want.  
13
This would be one reason for the frequent finding in the experimental economics literature that WTA
is larger than WTP, since these values are taken at current incomes not at the incomes that would
actually be generated if the public good were decremented or incremented.  The current discussion
complicates this endogeneity point in that WTP is itself too low because of input market free riding.
at that provision level.    Households still have no incentive to reveal how much12
more they would work for increments to the public good, even if they have very
0high marginal value at G *, because they cannot individually increment the public
good. 
The situation is illustrated in Figure 1.  The level of public good provision
is on the horizontal axis, while marginal benefits and marginal provision costs are
Trueon the vertical axis.  The MB  curve represents the (unobserved) aggregate
marginal-willingness-to-pay for the public good when there is neither the
traditional output demand revelation problem nor the input demand revelation
problem emphasized here.  It shows the marginal willingness-to-pay if people
could increment the public good by their individual decisions to generate income,
as they can with ordinary private goods.  Leisure and ordinary goods consumption
are, in other words, being optimally varied (from society’s perspective) by
Trueindividuals along MB  at various hypothetical levels of collectively determined
public good provision, G.  If larger levels of G are provided, financed either by
taxes or higher private goods prices, one would expect that households would
react by consuming smaller levels of private goods and leisure, in some mix. 
However, holding leisure fixed at any level results in steeper conditional
marginal-willingness-to-pay curves.  Consider the case of an increment to the
public good.  The marginal value of the public good will appear to the benefit-
cost analyst to fall more rapidly (the value of foregone ordinary private goods will
rise more rapidly) when households do not reduce their leisure to obtain greater
income than would be the case if they exercised that option.  Similarly, for
decrements to the public good, being constrained to have a larger than optimal
income implies that households would be willing to give up more goods to avoid
that decrement.13
There will be an infinite number of leisure-fixed marginal willingness-to-
pay curves (two being shown in Figure 1).  Each such curve possesses one point
at which the fixed leisure constraint is non-binding, where the curve intersects
TrueMB .  That is, at each level of the public good there will be one level of fixed
14
The gap discussed in the text will be getting larger over time with a positive–and perhaps
superior–ordinary income elasticity of demand for the public good, creating ever-increasing political
pressure to intervene.  Individuals will come to realize that, while it is irrational to individually pay,
it might be rational to force everyone to pay as the gap gets larger.
leisure will also corresponds to the optimal leisure for that public good level.
In the figure, were there neither output demand nor input demand
Truerevelation problems, the regulatory authority would clearly produce G *, the
public good level at which true marginal benefits equal marginal provision costs,
the one true Samuelson optimum optimorum.
Now, oppositely, assume the presence of the traditional demand revelation
problem.  In this case, rational decision makers are unwilling to reveal their true
demands for public goods because they know they cannot be excluded from
consuming whatever happens to be provided anyway, and that any revealed
demands would negligibly effect the provision level.  Moreover, assume that
these rational people also will not give up valuable leisure to generate income to
buy things that they cannot individually acquire by doing so, the input demand
revelation problem that is embedded in the traditional output demand revelation
problem.  In other words, consider the extreme polar case of the situation that
would give rise to the true optimum.  Self-interested individuals are generating
the wrong income level and they are unwilling to reveal what public goods are
worth to them at that wrong income level.  In this extreme situation, the provision
level for the public goods will initially be zero, since there will appear to be no
demand whatsoever for such goods, as reflected in Equation 2) above.  
Eventually, as discussed earlier, the growing gap between the true
marginal benefits and the marginal costs of the public good will result in
regulation via the political system (e.g. creation of the EPA, passage of an
Endangered Species Act, Kyoto agreements, etc.).   A positive quantity of the14
public good will be provided, either directly by government or by a regulated
private sector, with taxes or prices rising as a consequence.  The initial provision
level is unlikely to be optimal according to any analytical benchmark.  
However, while not of importance to the argument, suppose that the
regulators have managed to stumble upon a mechanism that accurately reveals
aggregate demand out of current income–a mechanism that does not, however,
solve the input demand revelation problem of interest here.  The dashed curve
Apparentlabeled MB  in Figure 1 depicts the marginal benefits observed by the
regulatory authorities in this situation, and presumably they would wish to
0provide G * of the public good, abstracting from any public choice disincentives
to do so.  
IV. A False and a True Dynamic Scenario
If there were no input demand revelation problem, individuals would reoptimize
leisure and private goods from their levels at a zero provision level to those
0appropriate to a G * public good provision level, consuming fewer private goods
and “buying” less leisure (working harder).  Hence, the regulators would now, in
L*1principle, see a larger demand for the public good, shown as MB  in Figure 1.
L*1MB  is the marginal benefit when leisure is constrained to the level appropriate
0to a G * provision level, hence it falls faster with G than does the marginal benefit
when leisure is optimally varied as discussed in Section III.  Should the
regulatory authorities conduct another benefit-cost analysis, one might expect that
1they would then find it optimal to provide G * of the public good.  At this point,
individuals would again reoptimize, resulting in a new marginal benefit curve,
L*2MB , which in turn would prompt the regulatory authority to provide more of
2the public good, at G * in the figure.  
This process might be expected to continue if benefit-cost analyses were
conducted for reasonably small increments to the public good.  If additionally
these analyses were conducted with some frequency, one might expect that actual
outcomes would come to approximate the true social optimum in Figure 1.  The
process described would seem to lead inexorably toward the optimum optimorum
depicted in the figure, with luck approximating it after perhaps only a few
benefit-cost iterations. 
The preceding discussion of the dynamic process essentially endogenizes
the labor supply decision as it relates to public goods provision in a 3-good world
of leisure, private, and public goods (see Flores and Graves 2008, for further
details).  But this description of the dynamic process errs in presuming that
0individuals will reoptimize their leisure and other goods consumption when G * is
provided.  Indeed, this is the whole point of the input demand revelation
0problem–individuals will only work to pay the higher costs associated with G *.
L*1The regulatory authorities do not observe MB  when the public good is provided
0 Apparentat the G *.  Rather they continue to only observe the MB  curve.  In going
0from zero to G *, households decrease leisure (and ordinary goods consumption)
0somewhat to pay the higher taxes or prices associated with having G *.
Critically, however, as with any project offering future benefits, those public good
benefits can only be obtained after first incurring costs (e.g. installing add-on
control devices, prior to receiving cleaner air).  Any adjustments to income
(changes in leisure) and private goods consumption that households would deem
optimal as a result of the costs of providing higher levels of the public good will
0also be made prior to arriving at G *.  Rational agents will make no further
adjustments, free riding in input markets even if (aggregated) marginal individual
values greatly exceed marginal provision costs.
15
Infrequent decision-making would suggest that both the failure to endogenize the labor/leisure
decision (see Flores and Graves 2008) and the input market free riding problem emphasized here will
work in the same direction, increasing the under-provision of public goods.
Apparent TrueThe vertical distance from MB  to the MB  curve represents the
(unknown) extent of the input demand revelation problem.  Were the output
demand revelation problem more important than the input demand revelation
Apparentproblem, MB  would be located further to the right of its hypothetical
Truelocation in Figure 1.  In such a case, the vertical distance to the MB  curve–the
input demand revelation problem of focus here–would be smaller.  However, the
regulatory authority inevitably only observes a portion of the true demand
(assuming quite optimistically that the output demand revelation problem has
been solved at some initial income level).
The labor-leisure endogenization process described in the first two
paragraphs of this section will, then, be short-circuited.  If the regulatory authority
0 1were to consider going from G * to G *, the costs would appear to be greater than
the benefits, and that movement would be (wrongly) rejected.
The true marginal benefit curve, for normal or superior public goods such
as environmental quality, is itself shifting out over time.  Rising real income due
to technological advances and innovations (most likely for ordinary private goods
for obvious excludability reasons), by increasing the relative abundance of private
True Apparentgoods will cause a shift to the right of both MB  and MB , still presuming
the traditional output demand revelation problem to be solved.  However, assume
for a moment that the relative importance of the output demand revelation
problem and the input demand revelation problem remains constant at higher
Trueincome levels.  A ten percent increase in MB  will lead to a ten percent increase
in each component, but only the output demand revelation problem is assumed
Apparentsolved.  Hence, the rightward shift in MB  will be smaller in absolute terms
than the overall shift in true marginal willingness to pay.  In other words, it is not
clear that “apparently-optimal” provision levels, derived from benefit-cost
analyses at current income levels, are even getting relatively closer to the
(moving) true optimum optimorum over time.  
In the real world, of course, decisions get made and are not revisited with
great frequency.   So a suspicion (returned to in the conclusions) is that we might15
be getting further from many public goods optima, despite progress in the sense
that many public goods levels are increasing.  Hence, as a practical matter public
goods are likely to be under-provided employing standard benefit-cost techniques,
even with the unrealistic assumption of perfect output demand revelation.
IV. Concluding Thoughts–Much Ado About Nothing? 
What is the potential importance of the input demand revelation problem
Apparentdiscussed here?  It is certainly the case that the MB  curve in Figure 1 could
Truehave been drawn to represent a larger proportion of MB .  There is, however,
much suggestive evidence that would imply that too few resources are being
devoted to certain public goods.  A first observation is that very small alterations
in leisure result in income changes that are quite large relative to current spending
on most public goods.
Illustrating with the case of environmental quality in the United States,
Freeman (2002, p. 126) has calculated that the U.S. spent at the time of his study
roughly $225 billion annually on all major environmental programs instituted
since 1970, say $280 billion in current dollars.  A mere one-percent increase in
income generated to go toward such environmental goods would amount to $140
billion at a current $14 trillion U.S. GDP.  Solving a input demand revelation
problem of even such small hypothetical magnitude would result in a 50%
increase in resources devoted to environmental public goods provision, and a
substantially improved environmental quality, even with rising marginal
provision costs.
Additionally, a robust finding in experimental economics is that
decision-makers often exhibit a much smaller dollar willingness-to-pay (WTP)
for an item than the minimum amount that they claim to be willing to accept
(WTA) to part with it (see Horowitz and McConnell 2002 for a survey of 45
studies).  Indeed, Sugden (1999) argues that the observed discrepancies between
WTA and WTP are so large as to be inconsistent with neoclassical preferences.
That WTA is large relative to WTP has been sometimes attributed to an
“endowment effect” (see Kahneman, et al. 1990, Twersky and Kahneman 1991)
in somewhat ad hoc, non-utility-based discussions.  There may well be merit in
their explanation, and perhaps other explanations, for the WTA-WTP gap (see
Boyce et al. 1992 or Hanemann 1991) and it is even possible that the gap does not
exist for ordinary private goods (see Plott and Zeiler 2007, who argue, employing
private good experiments, that the WTA-WTP gap is illusory, due to flawed
analysis).  
However, Horowitz and McConnell’s observation that the WTA-WTP gap
is by far the largest for public goods, suggests the possible importance of the
arguments presented here.  For example, when contemplating small increments to
air quality people will often express quite small marginal willingness-to-pay, but
will claim to require order-of-magnitude larger amounts to compensate for
equally-small decrements to air quality.  The ungenerated income resulting from
the input market demand revelation problem would add to the WTP, greatly
reducing the gap, and suggesting that WTA, might more closely approximate
16
In stated-preference studies, people routinely claim larger values than seem plausible at their income
level (but note that current income is what is elicited, when it is the income that would be earned to
acquire the good in question that is of relevance).  That is, it is possible that the stated preference
results are closer to the “truth” than previously thought, with actual behavior “false” because of the
input demand revelation problem for public goods.  See, however, footnote 13 for an argument that
WTA is biased upward, at least somewhat, by the failure to allow for reduced income generation in
the presence of a public good decrement.  That is, if a public good is decremented the individual will
have an incentive to increase leisure, but from an already non-optimally high leisure level.
properly measured WTP.16
 The arguments here may also account for seemingly “faulty”
environmental perceptions, perceptions that certain conditions are worsening
when official data would suggest that they are improving.  For example, a large
majority of surveyed Americans believe US air quality is deteriorating, while less
than one out of four believe that air quality has gotten “better” in recent decades,
despite average reductions of 77 million tons per year of EPA criteria pollutants.
Clear improvements in environmental measures are being perceived as
deterioration.  While there may be competing hypotheses (e.g. bias introduced by
environmental groups or the liberal media), it is possible that “more feels like
less”–that we are doing “better” in absolute terms, but worse in relative terms.
The growth in real income, and hence consumption of private goods, may well
have lowered private good values relative to public good values.  It is, of course,
relative values that matter in economics. 
One might counter the preceding arguments by claiming that Americans,
and Europeans to a lesser extent, work long hours already, hence would be
unlikely to be willing to work still harder to obtain higher levels of public goods
such as environmental quality.  The discussion of most of this paper has
implicitly assumed, to focus on the symmetric free riding behaviors, that the
public good is independent of leisure and private goods.  It is clear, however, that
households in all countries do generate a great deal of income to buy private good
substitutes for improperly provided public goods.  Focusing on the case of
“location-fixed” public goods, one might argue that non-optimal suburbanization
has occurred because of failure to properly provide school quality, low crime,
park space and the like in our urban centers.  Hence optimal provision of such
goods need not necessarily result in a greater net work effort, since costly
commuting can be avoided and desirable urban amenities such as culture or
restaurant diversity, can be consumed at lower expense were public goods
properly provided at the urban center.  
But the general point remains: only if perfect private good substitutes
existed for all public goods would households generate the correct amount of
income and receive the correct amounts of private and public goods (private and
public not being distinguishable in this case).  This is highly implausible.
Another counter argument to the importance of the observations being
17
It should perhaps be noted that existing solutions to the output demand revelation problem require
quasi-linear preferences which would appear to be particularly restrictive in light of the input demand
revelation problem emphasized here.
made here is that pure public goods are comparatively rare.  Most of the goods we
care about are private, hence the welfare loss from even substantial under-
provision of public goods might be small.  However, any collectively provided
good, whether a pure public in the classic sense or not, will suffer from the
problems discussed here, since individuals are unlikely or unable to increment
such goods individually.  
Moreover, the input demand revelation problem will be present for any
good for which “non-use” value is a significant component of overall value, of
particular interest in the environmental context.  Consider impure public goods
many of which, while non-excludable, are rivalrous.  The use values for such
goods may be reflected in resource allocation decisions, as emphasized by Coase
(1960).  Non-use values, however, will be understated because of both traditional
output demand revelation difficulties and the input demand revelation problems.  
Particularly noteworthy are contentious issues of preservation (cut the old-
growth forests versus preserve them, drill for oil or natural gas versus preserve
2pristine areas, drive a species to extinction versus preserve it, maintenance of CO
levels, and so on).  Such controversies often involve clashes among the relatively
few with high private use values and the many with non-use values of varying
magnitude.  Since rational individuals in the latter group will know they are too
small to make a difference, they will neither give up leisure to generate income
for preservation nor accurately reveal willingness to pay given the income
generated.  The resources are much more likely to be allocated to their use values
a la Coase, when perhaps that would be non-optimal in many cases.
 The implications for the practical relevance of the Coase theorem are
clear: both the traditional output demand revelation difficulty and the input
demand revelation difficulty discussed here are likely to result in inefficient
resource allocation when non-use values are important for any good.  Indeed,
whether a forest is privately-owned or publicly-owned, the non-use values might
in some cases swamp in magnitude the use values, leading to resource
misallocation when the non-use values are mismeasured, due to either output
demand or input demand revelation problems.  It seems exceedingly unlikely that
both problems can be surmounted in practical policy settings.17
As mentioned briefly earlier, real income (output) has risen dramatically
over time in the developed world.  This implies that marginal values of ordinary
goods will have fallen relative to marginal values of public goods and goods with
important non-use value.  The gap between the growing optimal provision of
public goods and their actual provision may well be increasing not decreasing,
despite cases of measured progress (e.g. those controversially documented by
Lomborg 2001).
In closing, the discussion here naturally leads to the policy-critical
question: “How do we proceed when we do not know how much income would in
fact have been generated if households could buy public goods as they can
ordinary private goods?”  Without specific knowledge of the full income utility
functions of a generally heterogeneous population, we appear to be in a bind, a
bind complicated by the fact that individuals have incentives in both input and
output markets to hide their true preferences.  Though speculative, one possibly
fruitful approach might be to increase public goods provision levels until their
WTA/WTP ratios approach the much lower ratios observed for ordinary private
goods.
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